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CURRENT LEGISLATION
companied by a proposed pleading which is to set forth the claim
or defense for which the intervention is sought.
The present section on intervention is preferable to the previous
section which formerly required an "interest" in the "subject" of the
action. The present provision is more definite in its requirements
and will not be subject to conflicting interpretations as to whether
such interest must be "direct" or "indirect."
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the new amend-
ments that they will do much to clarify and facilitate methods of
procedure in the New York courts.
JOSEPH F. DOLAN.
DoMESTIc RELATIONS-ADULTERY AS A GRouND FOR SEPARA-
TION.-The Civil Practice Act has been amended to allow a spouse
to maintain an action for separation from bed and board on the
ground of an act of adultery of the other spouse.'
Prior to the amendment the innocent party was entitled to a
separation upon proving one of four grounds, to wit: abandonment,
conduct of the defendant rendering it unsafe or improper for plain-
tiff to continue to cohabit with the defendant, neglect or refusal of
the husband to support the wife and cruel and inhuman treatment.2
When adultery constituted legal cruelty it was cause for a judicial
separation. Thus it was held, ". . . if the adultery is open and
notorious, flaunted in the eyes of the public or dragged into the pres-
ence of the blameless wife or husband, two wrongs arise out of the
act: the adultery itself which is so gross an offense against the mar-
riage as in itself to lead to a dissolution of the marriage, and
cruelty. . . ." 3 Clandestine adultery was not sufficient justification
for the separation; 4 adultery in and of itself did not constitute cruel
and inhuman treatment.5 There was thus created the somewhat
anomalous situation that a wrongful act greater in degree could not
be the ground for relief lesser in extent. With the addition of sub-
I N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1161, amended by Ch. 774 of the Laws of 1947,
effective April 10, 1947.
2 Old N. Y. Civ. PPac. AcT § 1161.
3 Hofmann v. Hofmann, 232 N. Y. 216, 218, 133 N. E. 450, 451 (1921);
Jacobstein v. Jacobstein, 201 N. Y. Supp. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd without
opinion, 240 N. Y. 693, 148 N. E. 761 (1925); accord, Goldsmith v. Goldsmith,
151 Misc. 198, 199, 270 N. Y. Supp. 48, 49 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
4 Compare Hofmann v. Hofmann, 232 N. Y. 215, 133 N. E. 450 (1921),
with McKee v. McKee, 241 App. Div. 149, 271 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1st Dep't
1934).5 See Lanyon Detective Agency, Inc. v. Cochrane, 240 N. Y. 274, 278,
148 N. E. 520, 521 (1925).
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division five 6 it is now possible to obtain a divorce, be it a inensa et
thoro or a vinculo matrimonii, if one spouse is guilty of adultery and
the other is without fault.
In an action for absolute divorce,7 although the adultery be
proved, the divorce will be denied if the defendant can establish in
recrimination the plaintiff's connivance, condonation, failure to in-
stitute the action within the requisite five years after the discovery
of the adultery or if the defendant successfully raises the defense
of the adultery of the plaintiff.s The legislature has incorporated into
Section 1161 like defenses to the action for separation based on
adultery.9 These exceptions to the successful prosecution of the ac-
tion for the partial dissolution of the marital status pose some new
problems.
One of the questions presented is, whether the defenses as enu-
merated in the statute are the exclusive defenses to the separation
action brought on the ground of adultery, or is the defendant able
to interpose as a countercharge and thereby defeat the plaintiff's
cause of action any of the grounds for separation which are, mani-
festly, less reprehensible in the eyes of the public, but which would,
nevertheless, but for the defendant's own misconduct result in a
separation decree for" such defendant?
The defense of recrimination is an ancient principle.10 Its com-
mon law origins are variously explained;" generally, however, it
is supported on the ground that since both spouses are guilty of mis-
conduct neither is entitled to the aid of the court of equity.' 2 Sec-
tion 1163 's is the statutory embodiment of the common law doctrine
of recrimination. It provides that, "the defendant in an action for
separation from bed and board may set up, in justification, the mis-
conduct of the plaintiff." The courts- in construing this statute have
not attempted to equate the wrongful conduct of the parties but have
denied relief to either, where husband and wife have been guilty of
misconduct. Thus, where wife charged abandonment the husband's
counterclaim of adultery was held sufficient to offset her claim; 14
G N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1161.
7 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 1147.8 N. Y. Civ. PAc. AcT § 1153.
9 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1161, subd. 5,"... except where such offense
is committed by the procurement or with the connivance of the plaintiff or
where there is voluntary cohabitation of the parties with the knowledge of the
offense or where action was not commenced within five years after the dis-
covery by the plaintiff of the offense charged or where the plaintiff has also
been guilty of adultery under such circumstances that the defendant would
have been entitled, if innocent, to a divorce."
10 Note, 29 MicH. L. Rat. 232 (1930).
11 Note, 26 COL. L. Rav. 83 (1926).
12 islankenship v. Blankenship, 51 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9 (1929); Hawkins
v. Hawkins, 193 N. Y. 409, 413, 86 N. E. 468, 470 (1908).
13 N. Y. Cm. PRAc. Act § 1163.
'4 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 193 N. Y. 409, 411, 86 N. E. 468, 469 (1908).
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where wife brought action against-her husband on the ground that
it was unsafe and improper for her to continue to cohabit with him
and husband recriminated with charges of adultery both were denied
relief; 15 where wife sued for separation on the ground of cruelty
the husband's countercharge of abandonment was sustained. 16 It
would seem improbable that the legislature intended the new ground
for separation to be excluded from the purview of Section 1163. A
contrary view would, in effect, be the adoption by inadvertence of the
doctrine of comparative rectitude. That doctrine permits relief to
the party less at fault.17 This doctrine has been adopted by but few
jurisdictions.1 8
It is submitted that Section 1163 applies equally to all the
grounds for separation as set forth in Section 1161; that any wrong-
ful conduct which will justify the decree of separation will be a de-
fense and a bar to the action for separation.
JULIUS VENEROFSKY.
15 Kamman v. Kamman, 167 App. Div. 423, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1122 (4th
Dep't 1915).
16 McKee v. McKee, 241 App. Div. 149, 271 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1st Dep't
1934).
17 Blankenship v. Blankenship, 51 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9 (1929).
Is See Note, 63 A. L. R. 1132 (1929).
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